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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jess Wade Yost appeals from the district court's order revoking probation. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Yost with two counts of sexual battery on a child 16 or 
17 years of age and one count of possession of sexually exploitative materials. 
(R., pp. 53-54.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Yost pied guilty to one count of 
sexual battery and the state dismissed the other two felony counts. (R., pp. 69-
70.) The district court entered judgment, imposing a sentence of 25 years with 
five years determinate and retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp. 79-85.) The court 
subsequently suspended execution of the sentence and placed Yost on 
probation. (R., pp. 93-97.) 
About 10 months later the state filed a motion to revoke probation, based 
on a report that Yost had been discharged from his treatment program "for non-
compliance with his treatment requirements," viewing and possessing 
pornographic materials (including multiple copies of the same video underlying 
the charges in this case), having unauthorized internet access, and violating the 
law by possessing child pornography (the video of the victim). (R., pp. 124-131.) 
Pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution, Yost admitted all of the reported 
probation violations except the one related to having the video involving his prior 
1 
victim. (R., p. 146; Supp. Tr., p. 4, L. 15 p. 5, L. 3; p. 8, L. 13 - p. 11, L. 3. 1) 
The district court executed the sentence, but reduced the fixed portion to three 
years. (R., pp. 155-158.) Yost filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 161-63.) 
1 There are two transcripts in this case. The one containing the final probation 
violation disposition hearing on June 8, 2015, will be herein cited as "Tr." while 
the transcript of the January 26, 2015 admit hearing and the March 2, 2015 
disposition hearing will be cited as "Supp. Tr." 
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ISSUES 
Yost states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Yost's equal protection and 
due process rights when it revoked probation due to Mr. 
Yost's indigent status? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Yost's probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Yost failed to show the district court committed fundamental error by 
not finding that his probation violations were the result of indigence where 
Yost did not claim that his violations were the result of indigence and he 
presented no evidence that his violations were the result of indigence? 





Yost Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By 
Not Finding That His Probation Violations Were The Result Of Indigence Where 
Yost Neither Claimed Nor Presented Evidence That His Violations Were The 
Result Of Indigence 
A. Introduction 
Yost claims for the first time on appeal that "his equal protection and due 
process rights were violated by the district court's revocation of his probation due 
to his indigent status." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) The claim that Yost's probation 
was revoked "due to his indigent status" is demonstrably false. Indigence played 
little, if any, role in the revocation. Rather, Yost's probation violations were failing 
to attend counselling, possessing pornography, and having unauthorized internet 
access. Yost has failed to demonstrate fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant must show that 
some action or inaction "(1) violates one or more of his unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
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to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 
228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. Yost's Claim Of A Violation Of His Due Process And Equal Protection 
Rights Is Unsupported By The Record 
Applying principles of due process and equal protection, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has stated that if a "probationer has made all 
reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no 
fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically 
without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the 
defendant are available." Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983). 
However, "the reasons for non-payment [are] of critical importance." kl at 668. 
The state is "perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction" when the 
probationer has "willfully refused to pay" or has not made "sufficient bona fide 
efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay." kl This standard 
has been applied by the Idaho Court of Appeals in the context of inability to pay 
for rehabilitative treatment and adequately safe housing. State v. Braaten, 144 
Idaho 606, 608-09, 167 P.3d 357, 359-60 (Ct. App. 2007).2 Review of the record 
shows that Yost has failed to demonstrate he made "all reasonable efforts" to 
comply with the terms of his probation. He also failed to show "adequate" 
methods of achieving the goals of probation other than sex offender treatment. 
2 The Supreme Court of the United States has not considered whether due 
process and equal protection standards apply to automatic revocation of 
probation and parole outside of the non-payment of fines and restitution. Black v. 
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610-11 (1985). 
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Yost violated his probation by not complying with his sex offender 
treatment, owning and viewing pornography, and having unauthorized internet 
access. (R., pp. 124-131, 146; Supp. Tr., p. 4, L. 15 - p. 5, L. 3; p. 8, L. 13 - p. 
11, L. 3.) There is no evidence that the last two of these violations had anything 
to do with his claim of indigence. To the contrary, the more obvious inference is 
that Yost had to pay for his pornography and internet. Thus, Yost has failed to 
show that his probation violations were the result of his indigence. 
In addition, the nexus between Yost's discharge from sex offender 
treatment and indigence is tenuous at best. The discharge summary by the 
treatment provider states Yost was discharged "for non-compliance with 
treatment requirements. He was not complying with weekly group and monthly 
session attendance and was in Treatment Hold Status because his balance was 
more than $200 past due." (R., p. 130.) The probation officer's report stated that 
Yost had "attended group and individual sessions inconsistently." (R., p. 126.) 
When Yost admitted violating his probation he stated both that he "didn't go" and 
that he was discharged "for financial reasons." (Supp. Tr., p. 8, L. 13 - p. 9, L. 
6.) 
At the initial disposition hearing Yost represented that he had paid his 
outstanding balance at the treatment provider and was thus eligible to renew that 
treatment. (Supp. Tr., p. 16, L. 21 - p. 17, L. 15; p. 20, L. 21 - p. 21, L. 7.) The 
district court, based on that representation, set over the disposition hearing to 
see whether Yost would become "fully engaged in treatment," stay "current on 
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[his] financial obligations," and be "otherwise compliant with all of [the] Court's 
terms and conditions." (Supp. Tr., p. 21, Ls. 14-22.) 
In the first three months after the district court set over the disposition so 
Yost could prove he could comply with probation he "attended 3 of 16 possible 
groups," did not attend "any of the required monthly individual sessions," and did 
not obtain a required polygraph. (R., p. 150.) Yost's counsel represented that 
the group sessions cost "around $45 apiece." (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 15-16.) Thus, 
despite working full time and living with his parents (R., p. 150; but see Tr., p. 6, 
Ls. 7-13 (counsel representing that Yost pays his parents rent and pays his own 
food and transportation-but no evidence of this was provided)), Yost averaged 
payments of only $45 per month toward sex offender treatment.3 
The record does not show Yost "made all reasonable efforts" to acquire 
the treatment, yet could not "through no fault of his own" due to indigence. 
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668-69. The record at least strongly suggests that Yost's 
efforts to obtain sex offender treatment were less than optimal. 
Even if Yost had made all reasonable efforts, the record does not suggest 
there were "adequate alternative methods" of achieving the goals of probation. 
3 Yost never presented any evidence of his financial situation. Rather, most of 
his claims were presented in the form of assertions by Yost's counsel. There are 
some disturbing inconsistencies in Yost's trial counsel's representations, 
however. For example, during the March 2, 2015 disposition hearing counsel 
represented that "Mr. Yost has paid off that balance and now has a zero balance 
with H & H Treatment and is eligible to start treatment again" and had even 
"saved up some funds so he can pay for those sessions." (Supp. Tr., p. 17, Ls. 
8-15.) At the June 8, 2015 disposition, however, counsel represented that Yost 
"was not able to get that balance [he owed H & H Treatment] paid off ... until very 
recently in April." (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 2-12.) Both of these contradictory factual claims 
cannot be true. 
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kL_; see also Braaten, 144 Idaho at 609-10, 167 P.3d at 360-61 (finding that 
although lack of treatment and housing was due to indigence, there were no 
adequate alternatives to imprisonment). There is nothing in the record indicating 
there were alternatives to incarceration where sex offender treatment in the 
community was not an option (for whatever reason). 
At the twice-continued disposition hearing the district court recognized the 
"financial concerns" of obtaining treatment in the community, but "given the 
nature of the underlying offense, if the defendant does not have the financial 
ability to fully and completely participate in sex offender treatment as required in 
the community, certainly that treatment is available in the correctional setting and 
financial ability does not interfere." (Tr., p. 9, L. 18 - p. 10, L. 5 (extraneous 
comma omitted).) Yost claims that this statement shows the court was punishing 
him for his indigence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) A fair reading of what the 
district court said shows it concluded that treatment was "required," and if it was 
not possible in the "community" due to non-payment it had to happen "in the 
correctional setting." (Tr., p. 9, L. 18 - p. 10, L. 5.) This determination shows 
that alternatives to incarceration were considered. Moreover, the district court 
took extra steps (in the form of granting continuances) to provide Yost every 
opportunity to get treatment in the community rather than in the correctional 
setting. The district court gave Yost every opportunity to prove he could get the 
needed sex offender treatment in the community, but he showed he could not. 
Yost suggests that the "alternative means" to achieve the goals of 
probation would be to "meet with his probation officer to develop budgeting and 
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money management skills." (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) The flaw in this argument is 
if the problem is so easily solved, Yost cannot claim to have made "all 
reasonable efforts" to address it. The record does not contain any viable 
alternative to sex offender treatment to achieve the goals of probation. 
Therefore, when treatment was not available in the community because Yost 
either could not or would not pay for it, there was no choice but to obtain that 
treatment in the correctional setting. 
Yost's claim fails on the first two prongs of the fundamental error standard. 
Nothing in this record gives confidence that Yost was actually doing everything 
he reasonably could to comply with probation, or that his non-compliance could 
be fixed by learning basic budgeting skills. Yost has not shown that his 
constitutional due process or equal protection rights were violated, or that the 
claimed error is clear on the record. 
Finally, Yost has failed to show prejudice. In addition to not attending sex 
offender treatment, Yost violated his probation by possessing and viewing 
pornography and having unauthorized internet access-violations completely 
unrelated to his financial situation. Yost has failed to show that he was 
prejudiced, because even discounting the failure of treatment there were ample 
grounds for revoking his probation. 
Although Yost was certainly failing to pay for his sex offender treatment, it 
is far from clear from the record that this was why he was missing sessions or 
that he could not have made paying for sex offender treatment a higher financial 
priority. Moreover, there is no record showing alternatives to incarceration if Yost 
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could or would not obtain sex offender treatment. Finally, Yost violated his 
probation in ways that had nothing to do with his alleged lack of financial 
resources. Yost has failed to show any of the three prongs of a fundamental 
error claim because his constitutional rights were not violated, no error is clear on 
the record, and there is no showing of prejudice. 
11. 
Yost Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Order Revoking 
Probation 
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district 
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)). Review of the 
record shows no abuse of discretion. 
Yost, at that time age 29, posted a video of him having sex with an 
intoxicated 16-year-old girl. (Confidential Exhibits, p. 28.) He apparently posted 
the video either in retaliation for the victim refusing to have sex with him a second 
time or for the victim's father firing him from his job. (Id.) Although this was his 
first felony conviction, he had been convicted of three prior misdemeanors. (Id. 
at 30.) 
Although he earned a probation recommendation, his performance on the 
retained jurisdiction program was marginal. (Id. at 53-54.) His sex offender risk 
assessment was in the "MODERATE-HIGH" range. (Id. at 54.) Within nine 
months of being placed on probation Yost was both discharged from his sex 
offender treatment and found with pornography involving adolescent females on 
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computer in folders containing the word "jailbait" in their titles. (R., pp. 126-
At that time he "admitted to viewing pornography over the past two months." 
(R., p. 127.) The facts of the underlying crime and the nature of the probation 
violations, combined with Yost's failure to pursue rehabilitation with any sort of 
adequacy, show the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked 
probation and imposed a reduced sentence. (Tr., p. 9, L. 4 - p. 10, L. 18.) 
Yost claims that the only reason he did not pursue his sex offender 
treatment was its cost. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) As shown above, review shows 
that this claim is, at best, debatable. Yost next claims that probation was 
meeting its rehabilitative goal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) This claim is based 
on the factually dubious assertion that his possession of pornography and getting 
unauthorized internet access was the result of treatment being too expensive. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 14.) The flaw in this argument is timing: Yost's probation 
officer found pornography on his computer on September 22, 2014 and Yost 
admitted he had accumulated the pornography over the prior two months (R., p. 
127), while he was discharged from sex-offender treatment for non-compliance 
on September 25, 2014 (R., p. 130). There is no evidence in the record 
suggesting that Yost would not have been downloading and viewing pornography 
but for his failure to regularly attend sex offender treatment. On the contrary, the 
record shows that Yost was simply less than entirely committed to rehabilitation. 
He has failed to show an abuse of discretion on the record. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
revoking probation. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of December, 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
JENNY C. SWINFORD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
KKJ/dd 
KENNETH K. JORGENS 
Deputy Attorney General 
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